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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ This is a pre-print version. Final version: Mihelj, S. (2011) 'Imperial Myths between Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of Imperial Legacies in the Northeastern Adriatic during the Early Cold War', European Historical Quarterly 41(4): 634-56. 3 materials to be selectively incorporated, whether by means of rejection or appropriation, into national myths of origins and national identity narratives. 6 However, modern political uses of imperial legacies in the North-eastern Adriatic cannot be reduced to nationalist frames of reference alone. As Glenda Sluga argued, the ethnic and cultural complexities of the North-eastern Adriatic inspired principles of sovereignty border legitimation that perceived cultural diversity as an asset to be preserved rather than an obstacle to be eliminated. 7 On the Italian side, and more broadly among Western observers, the Cold War confrontation gradually pushed these alternative solutions to border disputes in the region beyond the margins of acceptable, associating them with totalitarian ambitions of the communist East. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, however, models of sovereignty and identity marginalised in the West assumed centre-stage. At least initially, communist principles of sovereignty and identity formation were sharply opposed to nationalism and strongly rooted in notions of proletarian internationalism, and hence intrinsically compatible with culturally and ethnically diverse states.
We should note that at the same time, the West was undergoing a profound transformation which led to a progressive weakening of nationalist principles: defence of the nation was becoming subordinated to supranational integration and defence of 'the Free World'. 8 In socialist countries, almost the reverse was taking place: loyalty to the international alliance of working peoples was gradually giving way to national attachments, and internationalism itself was turning into a form of nationalism.
9
Despite the constant emphasis on the incompatibility of communism and nationalism, 6 For similar uses of imperial legacies in other post-imperial settings see e.g. L. Carl Brown (ed. This is a pre-print version. into the nineteenth century. 12 In the years following World War II, the North-eastern This is a pre-print version. This The break with inter-war Yugoslavism was achieved in two main ways. First, the emphasis on 'unity' was balanced by an emphasis on equality or 'brotherhood' of all Yugoslav nations. This joint emphasis on 'brotherhood and unity' constituted the main pillar of the communist Yugoslav civil religion, 67 and helped disentangle the new Yugoslavism from any pretensions of creating a unified Yugoslav nation. As such, it was believed to guard the new Yugoslavia against the 'mistake' purportedly committed by both its interwar predecessor and the Habsburg Empire, namely the attempt to forcibly assimilate all peoples into one single nation. 68 The second element However, argued the author, this oppression did not lead to an all-out anti-Italian retaliation:
In such a situation one could expect that the struggle against Italian The break with Soviet Union also marked the beginning of a slight shift in the relative weight of nationalist aspirations and class struggle, in favour of the former. Geocultural demarcations were now regularly appearing side-by-side with socio-economic ones. Particularly in the realm of foreign policy, Yugoslavia was beginning to adopt a new geo-political identity, positioning itself outside of the two 'imperialist' blocks, belonging neither to the East nor to the West. 'We,' argued Tito in a speech given in 1954, 'are following our own path into socialism, and we will not allow anyone, With the definitive annexation of Slovenian Istria to the Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, also our most immediate homeland Slovenia obtained its window onto the world -the see. For long centuries we have been violently and with deliberate thoroughness pushed away from the coast, and denied recognition that this is our coast, that we have a right to it and that it belongs to nobody else but us.
87
The growing presence of nationalist over communist frameworks signalled a trend that was to strengthen in the following decades.
Conclusions
Based on the material examined in the paper, we can conclude that the function of imperial myths cannot be reduced to nation-building alone, or understood solely with reference to nationalist principles of legitimation. Instead, we should distinguish between at least two main patterns of uses of imperial legacies, one organised within the nationalist framework of reference, the other within the communist one. The 
